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Abstract 
Assuring the well-being of children has emerged over the past several decades as an important goal 
for health and social policymakers. Although the concept of child well-being has been operationalized 
and measured in different ways by different child-serving entities, there are few unifying theories that 
could undergird and inform these various conceptual and measurement efforts. In this paper, we 
attempt to construct a theory of child well-being.  We first review the social and policy history of the 
concept of child well-being, and briefly review its measurement based on these conceptualizations. 
We then examine three types of theories of well-being extant in philosophy – mental states theories, 
desire-based theories and needs-based theories – and investigate their suitability to serve as 
prototypes of a theory of child well-being. We develop a constraint that child well-being is important in 
and of itself and not merely as a way station to future adult well-being (we call this a non-reduction 
constraint). Using this constraint, we identify the limitations of each of the three sets of theories to 
serve as a basis for a theory of child well-being. Based on a developmentalist approach, we then 
articulate a theory of child well-being that contains two conditions. First, a child’s stage-appropriate 
capacities that equip her for successful adulthood, given her environment; and, second, an 
engagement with the world in child-appropriate ways. We conclude by reviewing seven implications of 
this theoretical approach for the measurement of child well-being.  
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1. Introduction 
Child well-being is an example of an object of scientific inquiry characterized by a plurality of 
approaches and measures. The notion of well-being of a child is also crucial to policy making, 
therapy, social work and, of course, personal deliberation and decision making about our lives. 
Yet, there is no explicit theory of child well-being underlying all of these valuable efforts (Pollard 
and Lee 2003; Axford 2009). Although there is a great deal of work on determinants and 
indicators of child well-being, there is neither consensus, nor much discussion on what 
constitutes child well-being. What exactly is it that is intrinsically good for children that our 
models of determinants study, and that our best measures detect? This is in stark contrast to 
the more general literature on well-being, in which theorizing about constituents of well-being is 
part and parcel of its empirical study (Diener et al. 2008). 
 
In this paper we propose a theory of child well-being that can serve as a foundation for existing 
and future social science and policy work. We do not claim that such a theory must be prior to 
any empirical study of child well-being. (It is, after all, possible to study an object whose nature 
we do not fully understand). Our theory has three promises: a) to explain why child well-being 
specialists focus on the causal factors and indicators that they do; b) to synthesize the 
judgments of experts from psychologists, to social workers, to philosophers; and c) to provide 
guidance on how to improve existing measures of child well-being.  
 
One obstacle to get out of the way is the idea that constituents of child well-being are obvious 
and commonsensical. Both history and philosophy show that it is far from being so. In sections 2 
and 3 we show that the notion of child well-being did not always exist, and that its understanding 
changed dramatically throughout history. In section 4 we review its current measurement 
practices in the hopes of limning their presuppositions about what child well-being is. Still, 
measures are often based on indicators of child well-being rather than on its components; so for 
the candidate components we review current theories of well-being in philosophy. We find that 
none come readily equipped to handle the case of children; however, some approaches do 
provide useful resources for building a theory. In our concluding sections, we propose what we 
call a Two Source theory and explore its payoffs, especially its implications for measurement 
and construct development. 
 
2. Historical Conceptualizations of Child Well-Being 
For much of human history, childhood for some seems to have been a stage best endured and 
survived rather than one best enjoyed and cherished (deMause 1995; Aries 1962). Writing in his 
Politics (Book II Part IV) Aristotle, for example, opposed Socrates’ notion of holding children in 
common (as opposed to within families) because of the risk of incest when child sex partners 
were not recognized as kin (Aristotle n.d.), suggesting that the sexual use of children was 
accepted practice within Athenian society. The systematic abandonment of children – whether 
to be reared by others, to serve as pages or servants in wealthier households, or to be bartered 
as hostages or slaves – has been a persistent feature of society from Babylonian times through 
17th century Ireland (Joyce 1968), seemingly unaccompanied by general social censure. And 
although whipping or mutilating children for disciplinary purposes had declined considerably by 
the 16th century, child labor was still seen as desirable and formed part of early social policy, 
such as Britain’s Act for the Relief of the Poor of 1598 (Tucker 1995). Admittedly, many children 
in antiquity and medieval times did grow up within loving and nurturing households, especially in 
western Europe (Pollock 1983; Hanawalt 1993). But for others, childhood was a generally 
hazardous period of one’s existence. 
 
 3 
Four interrelated developments in the 17th through 19th centuries increased the importance of 
children. First, western Europe and northern America began their demographic transitions from 
high-fertility, high-child mortality societies to ones characterized by lower fertility and lower child 
mortality (Teitelbaum 1984; R. D. Brown 1976). As children became fewer, they became more 
valuable. Second, the rise of the industrial revolution in 18th century dramatically expanded the 
entry of children into organized labor; children, consequently, had far greater economic value 
than they had ever enjoyed throughout human history (Thompson 1968). Third, by the late 19th 
century in America, greater emotional investments in children rendered their economic utility as 
wage earners “radically incompatible” (Zelizer 1985). Soon, children began exiting the labor 
market; parental emotional investments in their children was quantified economically, and used 
in legal compensation when wrongful death or injury to a child occurred; child life insurance 
changed from compensation for lost income and burial charges to coverage for parental 
emotional loss; and children began to be seen as having an intrinsic supra-economic worth – a 
special category to whom theories of labor economics did not apply (Dobbin 2004). Finally, the 
influence of Enlightenment thinkers like Rousseau, who argued for developmentally-appropriate 
education, accelerated educational opportunities for middle-class children, adding to their 
human capital (Rousseau et al. 2010). Rousseau’s ideas had far greater influence in America 
than in France; in the 18th century a third of all French children were abandoned, at a time when 
the Puritans in Massachusetts outlawed the practice and required parents to care for their 
children (Sealander 2003).  
 
3. The Policy History of the Notion of Child Well-Being 
The emergence of children as social entities – instead of as purely intrafamilial entities – in the 
18th century led to societal attempts to enforce their care. Now, this is not to say that there were 
no systematic efforts to protect children prior to the 18th century. In fact, in an attempt to prevent 
population decline in Rome, legislation treating infanticide as murder had been enacted in 374 
CE, ecclesiastical authorities in the 4th century had begun to require the reading of the names of 
abandoned children in churches where they could be adopted, and the first orphanage had 
been established in Milan as early as 787 CE (deMause 1995). But these efforts were 
principally local, and did not seem to represent organized societal efforts towards the 
safeguarding of children. The British Parliament’s passage of legislation aimed at relief for the 
poor in Elizabethan England in 1598, and then again in 1601, were early examples of state 
policymaking for the protection of children. Despite such pioneering legislation, state 
intervention in matters of the family in Britain, the Netherlands, and France was undertaken with 
‘reluctance’ (Levene 2006).  
 
American social policy did not share this reluctance (Simms 1991). Paying families to take care 
of neglected children dates back to 1868 when the state of Massachusetts began paying board 
rates of $2 a week to families who took a child into their homes (Bremner 1970). While perhaps 
motivated by a desire to minimize economic exploitation of the placed child and to protect them 
from institutional care, the system was also motivated by a desire to accelerate the placement of 
those difficult to place – the child with physical and mental disabilities. This focus on disability 
marked an expansion of the targets of social policy directed at children and, consequently, an 
expansion of what assuring well-being actually meant. Hitherto, the purpose of policymaking 
had been principally protective in nature, guaranteeing the safety of children, their feeding and 
shelter, and their protection from physical or sexual exploitation. Beginning in the 1890s, 
policymaking embraced “child saving,” which involved removing children from almshouses, 
creation of societies to prevent child cruelty, deinstitutionalization of children into foster homes, 
reformation of juvenile justice by the introduction of courts focused on youth and the expansion 
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of probation, educational reform, promoting playgrounds for children, and efforts to reduce child 
mortality and infectious disease (M. B. Katz 1996).   
 
Federal policymaking soon not only expanded the notion of well-being at the child level, it also 
expanded it to the child’s parents and other caregivers (Bornstein et al. 2012). This social-
ecological approach to child well-being is illustrated by the passage of the Aid to Dependent 
Children legislation as Title IV-A of the 1935 Social Security Act. Under the provisions of this 
legislation, poor families that would otherwise have had to give up their children to orphanages 
or into foster care could now receive support that would enable them to keep their children with 
them in their own homes (Hacsi 1995). The passage of the Adoption Assistance and Child 
Welfare Act of 1980 created a new title, Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, and made available 
federal funding for in-home services, efforts toward early family reunification, and other 
programs intended to prevent families from breaking up.  
     
Child well-being emerged as an explicit target of Federal policymaking with the passage of the 
landmark 1997 Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), which recognized that the needs of 
children presenting to child protection and child welfare agencies in the United States were 
becoming increasingly complex (English and Freundlich 1997). ASFA added a metric of well-
being, and required that states show progress towards assuring the well-being of children within 
their care and custody. Well-being was operationalized into three domains: (1) Families have 
enhanced capacity to provide for their children's needs. (2) Children receive appropriate 
services to meet their educational needs. (3) Children receive adequate services to meet their 
physical and mental health needs (United States Department of Health and Human Services. 
2006) . 
 
Although ASFA is perhaps the most explicit legislative effort to promote child well-being, it is but 
one thread in the warp and weft of American policy towards safeguarding the well-being of 
children. Child-oriented policy today has been enacted by a variety of regulatory agencies 
concerned with welfare, health, education, and labor. Each of these agencies has 
conceptualized child well-being in different ways – family support, health services, educational 
access, and delayed entry into the labor market, among others. For instance, passage of 
income support policies (“welfare reform”) occurred with the support of three major children’s 
advocacy organizations, which presumably recognized the central role of economic support to 
families in assuring the welfare of children (Weaver 2000). Mandatory immunizations and many 
provisions of Medicaid were expressly designed to resource the preventative and curative 
healthcare needs of children (Olson 2010; Engel 2006). The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
barred the employment of youth under the age of 17 years in hazardous industries, and an 
amendment introduced in 1974 further restricted children under the age of 12 from working on 
farms (Whittaker 2004). In the field of education, school attendance was made compulsory for 
children between the ages of 7 and 14, first in Massachusetts in 1852, and then in other New 
England states (M. S. Katz 1976). These efforts at school-aged children soon expanded to 
younger children. The Sheppard-Towner Maternity and Child Protection Act of 1921 sent female 
nurses into homes of infants and young children, examining their little bodies and advising their 
mothers about proper child development (Nolan 1998). Nursery schools, established by the 
Works Progress Administration in the 1930s, and Head Start established in 1965, greatly 
expanded the role of government in assuring the social and cognitive development of preschool 
children (Sealander 2003; Zigler and Muenchow 1992). Nor has the physical health of children 
been neglected; from governing milk safety standards (Duffy 1990), to mandating physical 
education in schools, to restricting (unsuccessfully) the size of carbonated beverage containers 
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in New York (Buckley 2013), government agencies have attempted various ways to assure the 
well-being of America’s children. 
 
This bewildering array of the goals of all of these efforts aimed at well-being is informed by what 
we referred to earlier as a model of the main determinants of child well-being. Policymakers in 
education, for example, and quite reasonably, conceive of child well-being with respect to the 
child’s social-cognitive status and attempt to find ways to maximize her educational 
achievement (“school readiness”). This approach also dominates current approaches to 
measurement, as we shall see below. 
 
4. The Measurement of Child Well-Being 
As we have seen, the history of the concept of child well-being is a progression from an 
emphasis on child protection (or child welfare, or child saving) to the aspiration that all aspects 
of the ontology of childhood should be promoted – intrapersonal, interpersonal, familial, and 
social – called child development or, in our usage, child well-being (A. Ben-Arieh 2010). This 
aspiration has resulted in a concomitant expansion in measuring child well-being, or developing 
indicators of well-being (Lippman 2007). Well-being today is seen as ecological, with 
measurement approaches transcending an intrapersonal focus and encompassing at least parts 
of a child’s lived experience. In such cases, assessments, instruments, and tests cede to 
broader indicators that track the well-being of children at a social, national, or international level 
(A. Ben-Arieh and Goerge 2006).  
 
Although social indicators have existed since the 1960s, the United Nations Children’s Fund’s 
(UNICEF) release of its State of the World’s Children report in 1979 accelerated the 
development of child well-being indicators by national bodies (A. Ben-Arieh 2010). Initially 
focused heavily on child survival and other child health outcomes, the current 2012 report, titled 
Children in an Urban World, has 13 domains of well-being (United Nations Children's Fund 
2012). These include traditional survival indicators (“basic indicators”), in addition to others 
contained in domains of children’s nutritional status, health risks, HIV/AIDS prevalence, 
educational access, demographics, family economic status, women’s status and health, child 
protection, temporal trends in a variety of areas, adolescent health, and two sections on health 
and social equity. The Child Health Indicators of Life and Development (CHILD) project, 
conducted as part of a European health monitoring program, identified 38 national indicators 
grouped within 4 domains – demographic and socio-economic, child health status and well-
being, health determinants with risk and protective factors, and child health system and policy 
(Rigby et al. 2003). Other pan-European efforts include one by Bradshaw and colleagues, who 
assess the performance of European Union member states on 8 clusters (children’s material 
situation, housing, health, subjective well-being, education, relationships, civic participation, and 
risk and safety). The Child and Youth Well-Being Index is another multidimensional measure 
that captures 28 indicators across 7 domains and explicitly tracks them over time (Land et al. 
2007; Land et al. 2001). These 8 clusters contain 23 domains, which in turn contain a total of 51 
indicators (Jonathan Bradshaw et al. 2007). In the United States, the Federal Interagency 
Forum on Child and Family Statistics has published national indicators of child well-being 
grouped into 7 domains: Family and Social Environment, Economic Circumstances, Health 
Care, Physical Environment and Safety, Behavior, Education, and Health (Federal Interagency 
Forum on Child and Family Statistics 2012). All of these are examples of the social indicators 
approach to measuring well-being (B. A. Brown and Moore 2005).  
 
Such global and multidimensional indicators reside along with, instead of in opposition to, 
indicators developed within a single discipline and serving the needs of professionals within that 
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discipline. Growth charts used to monitor the physical stature of infants are examples of an 
index that is unidimensional, is exclusively child-focused, and is used in pediatricians’ offices 
worldwide (Ziegler and Nelson 2012). Recognizing the differing needs of child welfare 
professionals, a measure of child well-being in the child welfare field (Magura and Moses 1986) 
defines child well-being in terms of context alone (caregiving environment, and adjustment, 
which can be thought of a response to this environment). Only 4 out of its 43 scales addresses 
children’s functioning. The design and use of indicators, therefore, is primarily to serve the 
needs of the individuals using them.  
 
Indicators of child well-being are also dynamic. In his review of changes in child indicators, 
Asher Ben-Arieh notes a total of 9 changes: a shift in focus from survival towards well-being, a 
shift from examining negative outcomes to studying positive outcomes, the increasing 
incorporation of a child rights perspective, an emphasis on the child’s current (rather than future) 
well-being, the development of indicators that cut across professional disciplines, the 
incorporation of children’s perspectives on well-being, the expansion of units of analyses from 
nations to other geographic units, the growth of composite indices, and an increasing policy 
relevance to such indicator development efforts (A. Ben-Arieh 2010). 
 
Synthetic approaches that attempt to construct conceptualizations of well-being – not 
necessarily focused on constructing indicators – also abound. Wulczyn and colleagues propose 
a conceptualization of well-being that recognizes that a child lives within his/her social ecology 
as well as exo- and macro-systems comprised of child serving agencies and policies and 
cultural norms; that recognizes that children display trajectories of competencies, risk of 
maltreatment, and consequent use of different types of services depending upon their age; and 
that preventative and empirical approaches can best serve their needs and contribute to their 
well-being (Wulczyn et al. 2005). Other approaches apply theories drawn from philosophy, such 
as the capabilities approach (Nussbaum 2011), to child well-being using empirical data 
(DiTommaso 2006).   
 
5. Theories of Well-being 
This last set of projects, which attempt to develop unitary conceptualizations of child well-being, 
is our starting point. We are looking for a unified theory of that which the diverse indicators 
measure. A natural place to start is by looking at theories of well-being developed by 
philosophers. These theories have been in the making since Plato and Aristotle, and are well 
worked out by now. Although they are not specifically about children, they are not about adults 
either. Rather, these are theories of what is intrinsically good for a person in the most general 
sense, all things considered, independently of who the person in question is and, importantly, 
independently of what is morally or aesthetically good. 
 
A common classification of theories of well-being divides them into mental states theories, 
desire-based theories and needs-based theories [(Parfit 1984), also see (Crisp 2008) for an 
overview and references to standard literature]. The best known mental state theory is 
hedonism – to do well is to feel well over the course of one’s life, that is to have a positive 
mental state. Other, mind-independent, features of the world do not matter directly. Well-being 
is just happiness. Despite common misconceptions, hedonism does not recommend a 
hedonistic life style (since that may not be appropriate for sustaining a positive mental state in 
the long run), and it does not claim that achievement, friendships and authenticity are 
unimportant (they can be, but only instrumentally, as means to achieve a positive mental state).  
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Desire-based theories are importantly different because they ground well-being in the actual 
fulfillment of the individual’s desires (or preferences, or values, or a life plan), not just in how the 
individual feels about their fulfillment. These theories are known as subjectivist because they 
take most seriously the requirement that the person’s well-being be determined only by her 
individual commitments. If she does not think it is important to her to feel good, for example, this 
must be respected. Still, most desire theorists introduce some constraints on what desires are 
constitutive of well-being. Not just any - it is usually thought - but only the fulfillment of 
considered or rational or informed desires, is most conducive to the attainment of well-being. 
 
Needs-based theorists usually operate with a notion of human nature – there are certain things 
humans need in virtue of being the kind of animals they are. They do need happiness (as 
hedonists insist), and maybe even fulfillment of one’s own individual life plan (as subjectivists 
insist), but they also need genuine relationships, and perhaps also contact with truth and beauty 
and other objective values. Humans need them whether they like it or not, which is why these 
theories are sometimes called ‘objectivist’. 
 
Our goal here is to test these theories as candidates for a theory of child well-being. Can they 
be straightforwardly extended to the case of children? Probably not, given that they were not 
created with children, but rather with a generic human (or animal, in the case of hedonism), in 
mind. While philosophers from Aristotle to Rousseau and beyond have been concerned with 
children in some way or another, they have not been concerned with developing a theory of 
well-being specific to them. It is unclear what explains the absence of a theory of child well-
being. Most likely it stems from the dominant and longstanding view of children as merely future 
adults, who, as a result, do not require a theory of their own. The deficiency model of childhood, 
according to which a child is defined as an incomplete or immature adult, is a natural companion 
to this view; see (Matthews 1994). By extension, the generic theory of well-being should be 
used for adults, and a child is doing well to the extent that he becomes a well-functioning adult. 
From this perspective, it makes sense to measure child well-being by measuring indicators of 
successful adulthood, and remnants of this concept persist today in notions of “well-becoming” 
(Asher Ben-Arieh and Frønes 2011). 
 
A solely future-based orientation is, however, limited. Children are, of course, in part future 
adults, but they are also something more [e.g., see Alison Gopnik for her view that “children and 
adults are different forms of homo sapiens” (Gopnik 2011)]. Hence, a theory of well-being for 
them has to be more than a theory for emerging adults. When developmental psychologists, 
social workers, and teachers worry about what is good for children, they do and should worry 
about more than just how to make children into successful adults. They are also concerned with 
a more philosophical and more fundamental question about the nature of a good childhood, 
independently of the outcomes it leads to in adulthood, and how to ensure that every child has a 
reasonable chance at a “good” childhood. It is thus a constraint on a theory of child well-being 
that it does not reduce childhood into a mere stage on the way to adulthood, but treats it as 
something important in and of itself. We call this the non-reduction constraint, and we can now 
test if existing theories of well-being can be extended to children while satisfying this constraint. 
 
Applied to children, hedonism states that a child’s life is going well to the extent that this child 
has a positive mental state, be it happiness, pleasure, satisfaction, or some other 
characterization. The non-reduction constraint means that we must specify that this positive 
mental state occurs during childhood, not throughout the child’s future life, or in adulthood. 
Applying this constraint implies that a child who was unhappy during childhood but “caught up” 
on happiness in adulthood does not come out as having had a good childhood. (Of course, this 
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is perfectly compatible with hedonism without this constraint – there are probably several happy 
adults who have transcended unhappy childhoods. But we are concerned here with happiness 
during childhood – child well-being – not with its adult manifestations.) 
 
Hedonism applied to children faces two problems that preclude it from being a suitable 
theoretical basis for child well-being – a positive mental state is neither (a) sufficient nor (b) 
necessary for well-being. Normally, philosophers dispatch the (a) sufficiency by appealing to the 
experience machine argument – who would think that a child hooked up to a machine that gives 
her a reliably positive mental state is doing well? (This is the central conceit in the 1999 science-
fiction film, The Matrix and a scenario popularized in philosophy by Robert Nozick.) But in case 
of children, we do not need to resort to this standard trick. Childhood is the time for developing 
crucial skills – learning to communicate, to secure attachment, to love and to trust, learning to 
use one’s body and mind to the extent that we are able – and it is the only time humans can 
acquire these skills. In other words, due to complex neurobiological maturational processes, a 
critical period, or window, exists within which mastery of these skills has to occur (Rice and 
Barone Jr 2000). A dramatic example of insufficiency of mental state accounts are children who 
grow up in orphanages and institutions under conditions of social deprivation (Nelson et al. 
2007). Prospective parents who visit them are often struck by their emotional blankness, 
equanimity, lack of crying, and a seemingly detached mental state – but positive only in the 
sense that their terrible state is not worth getting upset about since nobody will come to their 
rescue. This is a variant of learned helplessness described in psychology (Abramson et al. 
1978), or of adaptive preferences described by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum (Teschl 
and Comim 2005). 
 
What about the argument against the (b) necessity of a positive mental state for well-being? 
One way to support this argument is to recognize that children’s emotional apparatus is not 
mature enough for their emotional state to properly reflect (and reflect upon) what is happening 
to them (Schore 1994). Children often exhibit highly labile emotional states, such as tantrums; 
yet, such tantrums are transitory and are rarely associated with residual deficits (Caspi 1987). A 
child who is well taken care of and loved, may not always be a happy child, even if she is happy 
generally. None of this is to deny the importance of happiness, laughter and joy for a good 
childhood, but it should be clear by now that as a theory, i.e. an account that specifies essential 
features of a good childhood, hedonism will not do. 
 
Desire-based theories are equally unsatisfactory, but for different reasons. On any desire-based 
view, well-being consists in the fulfillment of the individual’s core commitments, which can be 
operationalized as her considered preferences (Sugden 2006), or rational aims (Scanlon 1998), 
or fully informed desires (Railton 2008). Any version of such a view postulates an intellectual 
capacity to form, to order and to evaluate goals, and to plan, tasks that require a high order of 
executive functioning that a child’s developing prefrontal cortex simply cannot support (Welsh et 
al. 1991). This is why societies impose minimum age limits for tasks that require higher levels of 
maturity and judgment, such as consuming alcohol, driving automobiles, or voting. 
 
Of course, a desire theorist can appeal to adult desires in order to underpin child well-being. For 
example, a rational adult may form preferences about how she would wish her childhood to 
have gone in order to best equip her to pursue her aims in adulthood. Those preferences would 
then underwrite this person’s well-being as a child. But this does not give us any guidance as to 
the core features of child well-being and how we might go about measuring them. Also, from a 
methodological perspective, should we ask successful and rational adults to reflect about their 
own childhoods? Such efforts can easily be tainted given what we know about the susceptibility 
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to suggestion of childhood memories from forensic settings (Pezdek and Banks 1996), and of 
problems associated with their recall during adulthood (Maughan and Rutter 1997). Finally, this 
approach fails our non-reduction constraint, as now child well-being has become entirely a 
matter of adult preferences.  
 
Need-based or objectivist views hold greatest promise for a theory of child well-being. Most 
such theories have roots in Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia, best translated as flourishing 
or excellent functioning in accordance with the organism’s nature. Aristotle’s original proposal 
appealed to rational exercise of distinctly human virtues such as prudence, courage and 
benevolence – a theory we should reject because, just like desire-based views, it demands the 
impossible of children. But there is a set of Aristotelian proposals that are far more applicable to 
the case of children. One that is especially promising is Richard Kraut’s developmentalism 
according to which well-being is “flourishing, that is possessing, developing and enjoying 
physical, cognitive and emotional powers of human beings, at whatever level that is appropriate 
to their stage of development.” (Kraut 2009). 
 
Developmentalism is a good starting point precisely because it is already proposed with beings 
other than adults in mind and does not require ad hoc moves to accommodate children. Still, 
there are two important gaps in the developmentalist proposal as it stands.  
 
The first gap is specifying the relevant powers that constitute flourishing. Kraut talks of cognitive, 
social, affective and physical skills, but says there is no mechanical procedure for making the 
list more precise; there are also some natural capacities that would be bad for us to develop. 
Instead, we start with some obvious examples (enjoying dinner with friends is good for us 
because it actualizes our powers of eating and socializing) and watch them fall into a pattern.	  	  
 
The problem though is that this method of generalizing from obvious examples cannot take us 
very far. Some natural capacities are bad for us to actualize, as Kraut accepts. For example, he 
claims that experiencing pain is bad for us (except instrumentally) even though it actualizes the 
power of our organism to respond to harm. Same with our powers to rape, to kill, and to pick our 
noses. So which powers exactly are good for us, and how do they trade off against each other? 
Other than appeals to common sense, we have no tools to answer these important questions. 
Kraut’s theory has been criticized on all of these grounds (Sobel 2011), and developmentalism 
requires further development in order to evolve into a fully fledged theory of well-being, let alone 
for child well-being. 
 
The other problem with developmentalism is the proper place of cultural and historical context. 
Kraut recognizes that some capacities depend on the existence of context, and so components 
of flourishing will change with changes in culture and history. But he also claims that developing 
our capacity to manipulate formal mathematical structures is good for us universally, not just 
relative to a culture. Clearly, a more straightforward and explicit incorporation of ecological, 
social and cultural context into a theory of child well-being is required, one that distinguishes 
between the universal and the particular, given a child’s social ecology. 
 
6. A Theory of Child Wellbeing 
This examination of existing measures and theories of well-being allows us to unify several 
crucial insights, and outline a theory of well-being. As we have seen, measures of child well-
being are invariably partially objective and multi-dimensional. This reflects the intuition that 
children’s mental states or stated desires can be neither the sole constituent, nor even a good 
indicator of their well-being.  
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Multidimensionality of measures points perhaps to the existence of several preconditions in a 
child’s life or several capabilities, the actualizations of which are crucial to this child’s good 
functioning. Both of these elements fit well in Kraut’s developmentalist framework outlined 
above. Developmentalism itself points to the forward-looking nature of well-being, which is 
especially suitable to the case of children. And finally, the non-reduction constraint means that 
our theory should capture something specific about children as their own beings and not merely 
future adults. 
 
Given the above, a theory of child well-being can be articulated as follows. A child is doing well 
to the extent that she: 
 
1. Develops those stage-appropriate capacities that would, for all we know, equip her 
for successful future, given her environment. 
2. And engages with the world in child-appropriate ways, for instance, with curiosity 
and exploration, spontaneity, and emotional security. 
 
The terms in bold are key elements of this theory. Stage-appropriateness reflects the fact that 
any theory of child well-being should be developmental, with the “whats” changing as a function 
of “whens”, relative to a child’s developmental age. (We avoid the term ‘age-appropriate’ to 
accommodate the facts of disability and variation among children’s ability to develop.) 
Successful future is supposed to represent the idea that child well-being is in part well-
becoming (Asher Ben-Arieh and Frønes 2011) and captures success at any stage of the future 
of a child including adulthood. Indeed, anyone’s well-being is in part well-becoming; for children, 
the forward-looking component is especially crucial because many of the skills they are 
developing can only be acquired in childhood, and the ultimate purpose of such acquisition is 
the successful use of these skills in adulthood. Environment reflects the fact that both age-
appropriateness and successful future depends in part of the social, economic, cultural 
environment. Children exist within a complex social ecology, and well-being is in many ways a 
goodness of fit between the child and her environment (Earls and Carlson 2001). This is the 
extent to which well-being is context-relative. But this relativity does not imply that any capacity 
actualization goes, so long as it suits the socio-cultural conditions. The notion of successful 
future is normative and can constrain the range of capacities that Condition 1 allows. For 
example, just because pick pocketing gives a child a shot at a future, does not mean it 
necessarily satisfies Condition 1, because it may not give her a shot at a successful future. 
What constitutes a successful future is, of course, a big question, one which we do not pretend 
to answer. Conceptually, the notion of child well-being depends on the notion of successful 
adulthood, but for purposes of measurement we can rely on an overlapping consensus within a 
given community about what it means to function well as an adult (Keyes et al. 2002). 
 
Recall the “which powers?” problem faced by Kraut’s developmentalism. Condition 1 of our 
theory answers this question by appeal to future outcomes within a given environment. At the 
within-child level, there is much empirical evidence that mastery of certain critical internal states 
during childhood presages successful adult mental health and physical health outcomes. For 
example, the ability to develop stable and secure attachment to an adult figure during infancy 
and early childhood seems to confer protection against the development of mood and anxiety 
disorders later in life (Warren et al. 1997). The psychological security engendered by stable 
attachment also seems to encourage exploration, something that is critical if children are to fully 
actualize their childhood (Grossmann et al. 2008). The ability to secure attachment is one 
example of the set of skills needed for a successful adulthood – the acquisition of self-
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regulation, the ability to communicate and to learn, and the ability to form social relationships, 
among others (Shonkoff and Phillips 2000).  
 
If Condition 1 attempted to specify the future-directed aspect of childhood, the Condition 2 tries 
to specify the ‘here and now’ aspect, for which we have laid the foundation previously. A good 
childhood is valuable not only because it leads to successful adulthood, but also for its own 
sake. What is it that is valuable in childhood for its own sake? Condition 2 introduces the notion 
of “child-appropriate ways” of relating to the world. What are these ways? To specify them we 
cannot appeal to the future outcomes, or the child’s desires, nor solely the child’s mental state. 
We treat child-appropriate ways as a combination of emotional outlook and behaviors, 
characteristic of well-faring children. Specifying these ways precisely and in a non-circular way 
is much of the task of disciplines as diverse as child psychiatry (Gemelli 1996) and population 
health (Hertzman and Wiens 1996). One way to reify these ways is to appeal to a prototype of 
“normal childhood” (Dixon and Stein 2006). There is a peculiar child’s way of looking at and 
relating to the world that involves attachment to humans and inanimate objects, exploration and 
curiosity, spontaneity, and the acquisition and expression of other behaviors. Each of these 
behaviors, attitudes, and modes of interaction change over time as the child’s brain matures and 
she acquires additional sociocognitive, sensorimotor, and executive capacity.  It is to this 
constellation of normative child development that is critical to a healthy childhood that we refer 
in our condition 2. 
 
Let us call this the Two Sources theory of child well-being to emphasize its main disagreement 
with the existing theories of well-being in philosophy. Conditions 1 and 2 are both necessary 
and jointly sufficient for child well-being. Neither can be reduced to, or traded off against, the 
other. Nor can it be articulated in terms of mental states or desires as hedonists and 
subjectivists would insist. Although there is a lot more to say on the precise ways of filling out 
the Two Sources theory, we can already begin to appreciate its payoffs. As promised, the theory 
explains why the best of the existing measures focus on future-oriented determinants: it is 
because certain factors, more than others, predict successful adulthood as Condition 1 urges is 
essential. Condition 2 explains dissatisfaction with measures that are solely focused on well-
becoming and the proliferation of subjective approaches. Our second goal was to systematize 
the diverse intuitions of experts on child well-being such as the role of ecology, children’s 
distinctness from adults, and the unique developmental role of childhood. Our third goal for the 
theory is to be a catalyst for better measurement, to which we now turn. 
 
7. Implications for Measurement 
This paper has primarily focused on examining, refuting, and synthesizing a theory of child well-
being; as such, a full treatment of the implications for such a theory for purposes of 
measurement is beyond the scope of this paper. However, such a theory has seven principal 
implications for the evaluation and further development of the measurement approaches that we 
have discussed earlier in this paper, which we discuss below. 
 
First, Condition 1 implies that measures of child well-being should incorporate not only 
subjective perceptions but also objective outcomes. In the current state of knowledge, objective 
measures, such as those capturing mental and physical health, family and belonging, safety, 
permanence, and educational achievement are associated with a range of positive outcomes in 
adulthood. It is conceivable that at some point, as subjects mature, subjective indicators of 
happiness and quality of life become more and more appropriate and even exhaustive. Now, 
researchers have used first person reports to measure well-being of adolescents in scientifically 
rigorous ways ((Yarcheski et al. 1994) among many others), and the Children and Young 
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People’s Outcome Framework captures important positive attitudes about their lives, subjective 
feelings of fitness and health, and a set of indicators covering enjoyment and achievement in 
school, sports, the arts, and social skills (J. Bradshaw 2006). While such approaches are 
important in capturing the ‘here-and-now,’ the future orientation of Condition 1 suggests that 
their assessment must not come at the expense of more objective measures such as – for 
example – those capturing the experience of bullying, use of substances, and school readiness, 
as captured by the Child Trends indicators (Child Trends 2014).  
 
Second, Condition 1 (and developmentalism, in general) implies that child well-being is 
invariably a developmentally-situated notion. Measures of well-being, therefore, have to 
incorporate stage-appropriate variations in the achievement of various domains of achievement, 
each of which can change over time (Land et al. 2007). Measures such as the EU25 Child Well-
Being Index are explicitly designed to measure domains of relevance to younger children (such 
as brushing teeth more than once a day, or eating breakfast daily) but also to older youth (such 
as youth labor market participation) (Jonathan Bradshaw et al. 2007). Other examples that take 
a developmental approach include the youth development set of Child Trends indicators (Child 
Trends 2014), and those measuring attainment of varying levels of cognitive development and 
education (Lippman et al. 2011).  Clearly, there may be indicators of child well-being – such as 
growth charts – that are unidimensional and do not require adaptation to the child’s age (the 
outcomes of such measurement are what vary with respect to the child’s age, not the measure 
itself). Such instruments are, however, few and far between, and developers of indicators need 
to explicitly justify the temporal applicability of their measures.  
 
Third, Condition 1 recognizes that differently abled children cannot automatically be assumed to 
be deficient in child well-being. While disability may restrict the scope of activity of childhood, 
and may make certain childhood experiences and processes harder to accomplish or achieve, 
indicators of well-being require adaptation if they are to do justice to the ontology of childhood 
disability. Many indicators capture the presence of disability – e.g., the presence of learning 
disabilities in Child Trends set of educational indicators (Child Trends 2014), or the ones 
proposed for Ireland’s National Children’s Strategy (Hanafin and Brooks 2005). But there seem 
to be few approaches to adapting well-being measurement to account for children with 
disabilities, something that future work will need to address. 
 
Fourth, Conditions 1 and 2 recognize that well-being is inherently an “ecosocial” or contextual 
notion, rooted within the social ecology of the particular child. Such social ecologies vary by 
childhood condition (such as poverty), geographical location (well-being may look very different 
in a low income country), or other such contextual factors as cultural norms or roles (Weisner 
1998). While some measures of well-being may be context independent (especially relational 
measures described earlier), others may be a function of their local circumstances. If so, 
comparing child well-being across national and historical environments, though important, is 
fraught with danger.  For example, the number of 1 year olds immunized against measles (an 
indicator within the Health domain of the UNICEF indicators) is an assessment of health system 
performance as measured on the child. The fact that Austria has only 76% of its children 
immunized against measles – an immunization rate shared by Congo – does not necessarily 
imply that those two countries have equivalent health system performances with respect to 
childhood immunizations. Using child-level or population-level indicators to make cross-national 
comparisons of ecological phenomena is challenging, and work that identifies ‘core indicators’ 
that can be reliably and validly used for such cross-national comparisons is necessary.  
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Fifth, being mindful of social ecology means that indicators not presume normative child rearing 
practices. Continued breastfeeding at age 2 [an indicator within the Nutrition domain of the 
UNICEF indicators referenced earlier (United Nations Children's Fund 2012)], for example, 
presupposes the availability of the mother (a condition that may not be met for some infants in 
the child welfare system), the ability of the mother to produce milk (a condition that may not be 
met in cases of maternal nutritional deficit), and the notion that this is a normative child feeding 
practice within her community. Relatedly, the achievement of several indicators is conditional 
upon health knowledge (in the above example, of the importance of breast milk for infants). 
Hence, assessing health knowledge – in the way that these UNICEF indicators assess 
knowledge of HIV/AIDS, for example – is critical to the interpretation of attainment of indicators. 
 
Sixth, indicators can either be transitive – being based on the successful attainment of prior 
indicators – or final, and measurement models should ideally consist of a mix of the two. 
Consider the UNICEF indicators referenced earlier (United Nations Children's Fund 2012). 
Participation in pre-primary school (an indicator within the Education domain), for example, is 
conditional upon successfully surviving past the period of infancy. Countries that have low infant 
survival can face a double jeopardy when it comes to reporting their pre-primary school 
participation rates.  
 
8. Conclusion 
Given its plurality, the search for a unified theory of child well-being is a worthwhile endeavor for 
child theorists. In this paper, we outline a theory of child well-being informed by its myriad 
conceptualizations in history, policy, and philosophy, and draw upon theory building in 
philosophy to articulate its elements. This effort is necessarily initial, and future efforts that use 
other conceptual and methodological tools are critical to evolve a theory of child well-being that 
encompasses the totality of the ontology of a child.   
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